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In the first paper of this work, the design and the architecture 
of our proposed model framework, VANET Security as a 
Service (VSaaS), was discussed. In this second paper, the 
performance metrics measurements will be investigated 
through the NS2, SUMO and Trans simulations, to evaluate 
the security overhead of the secure Vehicle Information 
Messages (VIMs), which are sent by the vehicles to the cloud 
as a coarse-grained information. Moreover, our proposed 
model framework (VSaaS) will be discussed against the 
security requirements in the VANET.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
As shown in the first paper of this work, VANET Security as 
a Service (VSaaS) is a VANET security model, modular and 
hosted on a cloud. The VSaaS manages the security services 
and provides a secure VANET communication between the 
different entities e.g. vehicles, authorities and etc. The VSaaS 
proposal provided the following:  
 VANET depends on cellular networks which acts as a 
gateway to the cloud to get services as the security 
services.     
 VSaaS is responsible for: 
• Vehicles and authorities registration. 
• Key Management mechanisms to generate the keys 
for the different entities and renew the keys when 
they become expired.  
• Authenticating vehicles and their information 
messages. In addition to authenticating the 
authorities that interacting with the VSaaS.  
• Vehicle identity identification mechanism to 
preserve the privacy and enable the traceability only 
for the trusted authorities that have a permission to 
track the vehicles.  
• Providing security access list to manage the 
permissions between the different entities. 
• Providing a mechanism to revoke the misbehaved 
vehicle and the compromised authority. 
• Providing modules to process the secure Vehicle 
Information Messages (VIMs), which are sent by 
the vehicles as coarse-information messages, and 
construct fine-information messages, which called 
Traffic Information Messages (TIMs), that are  
disseminated to the vehicles based on their 
locations.    
In order to show the feasibility of the VSaaS, the performance 
metrics measurements will be investigated in this paper 
through the NS2, SUMO and the Trans simulations, to 
evaluate the security overhead of the secure Vehicle 
Information Messages (VIMs), which are sent by the vehicles 
to the cloud as a coarse-grained information. Moreover, our 
proposed model framework (VSaaS) will be discussed against 
the security requirements in the VANET.  
The rest of this paper is organized as: Section 2 presents the 
performance analysis of the secure Vehicle Information 
Messages (VIMs) in our proposed VSaaS. Section 3 presents 
the simulation results. Section 4 presents the security analysis. 
Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. THE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF 
THE SECURE VEHICLE 
INFORMATION MESSAGES (VIMs) 
IN OUR PROPOSED VSaaS 
This section evaluates and analyzes the performance of the 
secure Vehicle Information Messages (VIMs), which are sent 
by the vehicles to the Certified Authority (CA) then to the 
storage where these components are hosted on the cloud. For 
a secure communication in the VANET, the security 
requirements should be satisfied. Therefore, there is a need to 
ensure that our proposed messages "Vehicle Information 
Messages (VIMs)" are effective and reliable. As a part of the 
security requirements, it is essential to meet certain 
performance requirements which guarantees that the VANET 
will work its function without any fail. Thus, the impact of the 
security model or protocols will be analyzed. In our work, the 
main security service is the (CA) which is responsible for the 
cryptographic and the authentication of the Vehicle 
Information Messages (VIMs), which are sent by the vehicles. 
The existing of the CA reveals two additional factors that 
should be taken into consideration, which are: the security 
overhead in the message size and the time taken for the 
encryption/decryption operations. As a result [1]:- 
Secure VIM size = standard VANET safety message size + 
security overhead size        (1)  
Time Overhead = Encryption Time + Transmitting Time 
(delay) + Decryption Time     (2) 
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2.1 Performance Matrices  
This work investigates the throughput, end to end delay and 
the message delivery rate as in [2], [3] and [4], to evaluate the 
performance of our security model (VSaaS) against the 
Vehicle Information Messages (VIMs), and answer the 
important question: Is the public key cryptography (CA 
service) fit? 
1. Throughput 
Throughput is the number of the packets passing through the 
network during a certain time. It counts the total number of 
packets that have been successfully delivered to the desired 
node. The throughput increases as the node density increases. 
It is measured in bits per second (bit/s or bps). Throughput 
can be represented mathematically as in the equation below: 
   (3) 
2. End-to-End Delay  
End-to-end delay is defined as the time taken for a packet to 
be transmitted across a network from the source to the 
destination. It is calculated by taking the average time for the 
data packet that arrive to the destination. It also includes the 
delay caused by the route discovery process and the queue in 
the data packet transmission. Only the data packets that are 
successfully delivered to the destination are counted. 
Furthermore, if the value of the delay is low, it means that the 
performance of the protocol is better. It is measured in second. 
The following equation is used to calculate the average end-
to-end delay,  
 (4) 
is the average End-to-End Delay, T_R is the time of 
received packets at the destination node, T_S is the time of 
sent packets from the source node, and n is the number of 
nodes. 
3. Message Delivery Rate  
Message delivery rate is the sum of the successful received 
messages by all the nodes in the network per second. It is 
measured in messages per second. The following equation  
is used to calculate the message delivery rate,  
       (5) 
2.2 Simulation Setup 
Our simulation work considers vehicles moving in a part of 
Cologne city which has a region size of 12594m x 6208m as 
shown in figure 1. This area has been covered by appropriate 
number of gateways that linked the vehicles to the cloud, 
where the CA and the storage are hosted. The simulation time 
has been set to 300 seconds. The Maximum Transmission 
Unit (MTU) has been set to 1500 bytes. The cloud delay was 
taken into consideration, which is approximately 30 
milliseconds as mentioned in [5]. And, the cloud backbone 
bandwidth has been set to 100 Mbps. The mobility model of 
the vehicles includes the speed, accelerator and the positions, 
which are retrieved from the map using the SUMO and the 
Trans simulators. Moreover, ns2 was configured to support 
the roaming among the gateways. 
 
Figure 1: a part of Cologne city map 
The aim of this simulation work is to evaluate the 
performance of our security framework model (VSaaS) 
against the secure Vehicle Information Messages (VIMs), 
which are sent by the vehicles to the CA, then to the storage 
where the CA and the storage are hosted in the cloud, as 
shown in the sample figure 2. And answer the important 
question: Is the public key cryptography (CA service) fit? To 
evaluate this security overhead, the performance metrics 
measurements should investigated. 
Because of the existing of the CA, its overhead factors should 
be taken into the consideration, which are: the security 
overhead in the message size, and the time taken for the 
encryption/decryption operations. 
 
Figure 2: Sample Figure of Simulated Topology 
2.3 The size overhead 
The normal size of the Vehicle Information Messages (VIMs) 
has been set to 200 bytes including the header, timestamp, 
message type (MT) value and etc, and according to the 
standard, the typical size of the safety messages in the 
VANET is between 100 and 200 bytes without the security 
size overhead [6][7]. Where the security overhead in the 
message size of the secure VIMs is resulted because of the 
encryption operation, which has been done by using the CA's 
public key (we choose RSA-2048bit which expands the 
normal message by 56 byte). So, the size of our proposed 
secure message (VIM) becomes 256 bytes as described in the 
equation (1). 
2.4 Benchmarks 
The simulation of our proposed protocol needs to use a speed 
(time) benchmark for the selected cryptographic algorithms. 
In [8], many cryptographic algorithms are tested on three 
different machines:  
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1. Intel Pentium 4 (Prescott) processor. Algorithms are 
coded in C++ and compiled with MS Visual C++ 2005 SP1. 
The operating system is Windows Vista 32-bit.  
2. Intel Core 2 1.83 GHz processor. Only one core of the 
CPU was used. Algorithms are coded in C++ and compiled 
with MS Visual C++ 2005 SP1. The operating system is 
Windows Vista 32-bit.  
3. AMD Opteron 8354 2.2 GHz processor. Algorithms are 
coded in C++ and compiled with GCC 4.1.2. The operating 
system is Linux.  
Table 1 shows the time needed by RSA2048 for the 
encryption and decryption operations on the selected 
machines. 







RSA 2048 Encryption 0.22 0.16 0.08 
RSA 2048 Decryption 10.53 6.08 2.90 
 
2.5 Simulation scenarios  
Scenario 1, the Simulation is executed for different number of 
vehicles: 25, 50, 75, 100, 125 and 150 with a normal message 
size of 200 bytes (without security), where the message rate is 
0.3 second. Moreover, the simulation is executed again for 
different number of vehicles: 25, 50, 75, 100, 125 and 150 
with security overhead (CA effects) where the message size 
becomes 256 bytes and take into consideration the 
encryption/decryption time overhead, and the message rate is 
also 0.3 second 
Scenario 2, the Simulation is executed for fixed number of 
vehicles which is 50 vehicles with a normal message size of 
200 bytes (without security) where the message rate is varied: 
0.1, 0.2. 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6 second. Moreover, the 
simulation is executed again for fixed number of vehicles 
which is 50 vehicles with security overhead (CA effects), 
where the message size becomes 256 bytes, and take into 
consideration the encryption/decryption time overhead, also 
the message rate is varied: 0.1, 0.2. 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6 
second. 
3. SIMULATION RESULTS 
3.1 Throughput Computation Cost 
Throughput is the main measurement in the performance 
matrices. Therefore, some computational works should be 
made in order to inform us if the security overhead is 
acceptable or not before the starting with the simulation 
implementation. The using of the CA (Public key 
cryptographic) is proposed to support the security in the 
VANET, it is important to accept its overhead in the vehicular 
context. Theoretically, according to the numerical upper 
bounds, the throughput can be calculated by using the 
following equation [1]: 
     (6) 
 
N is the number of vehicles, R is the messaging rate (message 
per second per vehicle) and M is the total message size 
(bytes).  
Table 2 gives us the theoretical calculated throughput values 
from equation 6 for the secure VIM, when its size is 256 
bytes, the message rate is 0.3 second and the number of 
vehicles is varied 25, 50, 75, 100, 125 and 150 
Table 2: No. of vehicles vs. throughput for secure VIM 
No. of 
vehicles 
25 50 75 100 125 150 
Throughput 
(kbps) 
162.5 325 487.5 650 812.5 975 
 
And, Table 3 gives us the theoretical calculated throughput 
values from equation 6 for the secure VIM when its size is 
256 bytes, the number of vehicles is 50 vehicles and the 
message rate is varied 0.1,0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6 second. 
Table 3: Message Rate vs. throughput for secure VIM 
Message 
Rate (sec) 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Throughput 
(kbps) 
977 488 325 244 195 163 
 
In the tables 2 and 3, the results show to us that the throughput 
increases linearly with the increase in the number of the 
vehicles, and with the increase in the message rate. All the 
throughput values are below 1 Mbps, which are afforded by 
the cloud-based infrastructure. Thus, as far as throughput is 
concerned and the effect of CA is acceptable. Moreover, the 
simulation results should be as similar or less than those 
calculated values. 
3.2 Simulation Results: Scenario 1 
1. Throughput 
Figure 3 shows the system throughput of the normal messages 
and the secure messages sent by the vehicles. Normally, the 
throughput increases linearly with the increase in the number 
of the vehicles, because the increasing in vehicles' number 
increases the number of the sent packets, which is resulted in 
the increasing number of the delivered packets. The delivered 
packets is the main factor in the throughput equation (3). 
 
Figure 3: Throughput vs. No. of Vehicles for both normal 
and secure messages 
Also, the effect of the CA in the throughput is shown in the 
figure 3, the throughput of the secure messages is more than 
the throughput of the normal messages, according to the 
security overhead in the message size that increases the 
throughput. But, this effect is acceptable because the 
infrastructure's throughput capacity can afford this overhead, 
and as shown in figure 3, the throughput did not exceed 1 
Mbps, even when the 150 vehicles sent secure messages to the 
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Finally, the throughput values of the simulation results are 
agreed with the computational works in table 2, because all 
the throughput values which got from the simulation are 
below the numerical upper bounds. 
2. End-to-end delay 
Figure 4 shows the end-to-end delay of the normal and secure 
messages sent by the vehicles. That delay is not be considered 
when the number of the vehicles increases, because of the low 










Figure 4: Delay vs. No. of Vehicles for both normal and 
secure messages 
Also, there is no considerable effects of the CA in the delay as 
shown in the figure 4. This is because the infrastructure can 
afford the security overhead in the message size and the 
cryptographic operations time overhead, according to the low 
contention on the medium and the high transmission rate that 
minimizes the effects of security overheads. Thus, the CA and 
the cryptographic operations do not critically affect the delay. 
In addition to, the delay values are between 42 ms and 63 ms; 
which are acceptable and good results in the cloud 
environment. 
3. Message delivery rate 
Figure 5 shows the message delivery rate of the normal 
messages and the secure messages sent by vehicles. Normally, 
the message delivery rate increases linearly as the number of 
vehicles increases, because the increase in the vehicles' 
number increases the number of the sent packets, which is 
resulted in the increasing number of the delivered packets. 
The delivered packets is the main factor in the message 
delivery rate equation (5). 
Also, there is no considerable effects of the CA in the 
message delivery rate as shown in the figure 5. This is 
because the infrastructure can afford the security overhead 
according to the low contention on the medium and the high 
transmission rate that minimizes the effects of the security 
overhead in the message size. Thus, the CA and the 







Figure 5: Message delivery rate vs. No. of Vehicles for 
both normal and secure messages 
3.3 Simulation Results: Scenario 2 
1. Throughput 
Figure 6 shows the system throughput of the normal messages 
and the secure messages sent by the vehicles. Normally, the 
throughput decreases as the message rate value increases, 
because  the increasing in the message rate value means 
decreasing in the number of the sent packet per second, which 
is resulted in the decreasing number of the delivered packets. 
The delivered packets is the main factor in the throughput 
equation (3). 
 
Figure 6: Throughput vs. Message Rate for both normal 
and secure messages 
Also, the effect of the CA in the throughput is shown in the 
figure 6, the throughput of the secure messages is more than 
the throughput of the normal messages, according to the 
security overhead which increases the message size that 
increases the throughput. But, this effect is acceptable because 
the infrastructure's throughput capacity can afford this 
overhead. And as shown in figure 6, the throughput does not 
exceed 1 Mbps, even when the message rate of the secure 
message is set to maximum (10 messages/vehicle/second). 
Finally, the throughput values of the simulation results are 
agreed with the computational works in table 3, because all 
the throughput values which got from the simulation are 
below the numerical upper bounds. 
2. End-to-end delay 
Figure 7 shows the end-to-end delay of the normal messages 
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considered when the message rate varied from 0.1 to 0.6 
seconds, because the infrastructure can afford this variation 
for both normal and secure messages according to the low 
contention on the medium and the high transmission rate that 











Figure 7: Delay vs. Message Rate for both normal and 
secure messages 
Also, there is no considerable effects of the CA in the delay as 
shown in the figure 7. This is because the infrastructure can 
afford the security overhead in the message size and the 
cryptographic operations time overhead according to the low 
contention on the medium and the high transmission rate, that 
minimizes the effects of these security overheads. Thus, the 
CA and the cryptographic operations do not critically affect 
the delay. 
In addition to, the delay values are between 49 ms and 57 ms, 
which are acceptable and good results in the cloud 
environment. 
3. Message delivery rate 
Figure 8 shows the message delivery rate of the normal 
messages and the secure messages sent by the vehicles. 
Normally, the message delivery rate decreases as the message 
rate value increases, because the increase in the message rate 
value means a decrease in the number of the sent packet, 
which is resulted in the decreasing number of the delivered 
packets. The delivered packets is the main factor in the 
message delivery rate equation (5). 
Also, there is no considerable effects of the CA in the 
message delivery rate as shown in the figure 8. This is 
because the infrastructure can afford the security overhead 
according to the low contention on the medium and the high 
transmission rate that minimizes the effects of the security 
overhead in the message size. Thus, the CA and the 













Figure 8: Message delivery rate vs. Message Rate for both 
normal and secure messages 
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS  
Firstly, our proposed model framework (VSaaS) will be 
discussed against the security requirements in the VANET. 
After that, some related security issues also will be discussed.  
4.1 VSaaS Against Security Requirements in 
VANET 
1. Identification and Authentication: the CA, which is a 
part of the VSaaS model, generates an identifier to every 
vehicle, which is called Vehicle Identification Number 
(VID), before giving a license to the work and registers 
this VID with CA itself. Thus, it should be understood 
that, the CA can identity and verify the vehicle by its VID 
to determine if it is a legitimate vehicle or not, where this 
VID should be added to the vehicles' messages in a secure 
way. This Identification prevents the intruders from 
sending false messages. It is not possible to track the VID 
of the vehicle only through the authorities that have a 
traceable permission. Also, CA generates an identifier to 
every authority, which is called Authority Identification 
Number (AID). Thus, it should be understood that, the CA 
can identity and verify an authority by its AID, to 
determine if it is a legitimate authority or not. This 
Identification prevents the intruders from cooperating with 
the VSaaS model. 
2. Privacy and Anonymity: For liability, vehicles' identities 
(VIDs) should be added to the vehicles' messages, but this 
requirement contradicts with the privacy. Therefore, 
vehicles' identities should be hidden (encrypted) from the 
others, only the CA can identify the vehicles' identities. 
To solve it, the CA generates a symmetric key which is 
called the privacy key Kpriv, it is used to encrypt/decrypt 
the vehicles' identities (VIDs). The VID is concatenating 
with the current reading (xy-coordinates) which is taken 
from the tamper GPS, then encrypting the all with the 
privacy key Kpriv to produce the EVID, which is added to 
each message as an alternative of the clear VID. It is 
worth to mention that, the privacy key Kpriv provides 
authentication and privacy. Authentication is achieved 
because only the registered and trusted vehicles have this 
privacy key Kpriv, where it is used to encrypt/decrypt the 
vehicles' identities (VIDs). Using the same privacy key 
Kpriv by all the vehicles at the same time, provides 
anonymity which achieves the privacy. And, the 
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before encryption, ensures that the EVID value is different 
for every message, and mitigates the linking between the 
two messages generated from the same vehicle. Also, the 
EVID is a part of the vehicles' messages, where the whole 
message is encrypted by the CA's public key. Thus, only 
CA can decrypt the whole message by the CA's private 
key to get the EVID.    
3. Confidentiality: all the messages sent by the vehicles and 
authorities are encrypted by the CA's public key. Thus, 
only CA can decrypt the messages by the CA's private 
key. In addition, the CA generates the secret shared key 
KSM that will be used to exchange the information and 
messages between the authority and the VSaaS modules. 
This keeps the content of messages secret. 
4. Authorization: the VSaaS provides the authorization 
through proposing a security access list (ACL), to manage 
the permissions. The ACL represents a set of permissions 
and rules to Allow/deny the inter-actions between the 
different entities (vehicles, authorities, VSaaS modules) 
and the intra-actions between the modules within the 
VSaaS. Our design of VSaaS is modular. It is easy to add 
new types of authorities, databases and VSaaS's modules 
by defining their permissions.  
5. Availability: It is essential for the part of security 
availability to meet certain performance requirements, 
which guarantees the VANET will work its function 
probably without any fail. This work simulated and 
evaluated the secure Vehicle Information Messages 
(VIMs) with the security overhead (CA effects).The 
performance of the secure Vehicle Information Messages 
(VIMs) is acceptable. The impact of the security overhead 
appears in the throughput because the security overhead in 
the message size has an increasing in the throughput, but 
this effect is acceptable because the infrastructure's 
throughput capacity can afford this overhead. There is no 
considerable effects of the CA in the message delivery 
rate and end-to-end delay because the low contention on 
the medium and the high transmission rate, minimize the 
effects of the security overheads. But, the availability of 
system like that, is something that cannot be fully 
guaranteed. The primary vulnerability, which lies in the 
different types of wireless technologies, is considered as 
jamming attacks. Also, the DoS attacks can be realized by 
sending too many messages to the specific destination, 
therefore, there won't be enough time to process the valid 
messages. Detection and prevention of the DoS also 
require mechanisms, hardware and software to satisfy the 
concept of the intrusion detection and prevention.  
6. Non-Reputation: Non-Repudiation is achieved in our 
work because of the following reasons: 1) The VSaaS is 
resistant against the masquerade attack. 2) Vehicles 
cannot cheat about their positions and related parameters 
because a secure positioning solution is used in the 
messages. 3) The vehicle cannot deny having a sent 
message, because it includes the vehicle's identity 
concatenated to its real xy coordination, and encrypts the 
all by the privacy key Kpriv. 4) The vehicle cannot claim 
that the message was replayed because the timestamp is 
included in each message. 
7. Entity Revocation: The VSaaS provides mechanisms to 
revoke the vehicles and authorities when they are engaged 
in a malicious activity. But, the methodology to determine 
a malicious activity is out of our scope work. 
4.2 More in Security 
Messages are provided by the timestamps to guarantee the 
message freshness and provide protection against the reply 
attacks. Only the authorities, that have a traceable permission, 
can track a vehicle through its VID. 
All mentioned keys in the VSaaS framework model are 
changed frequently in a way to keep the content of messages 
secret, and prevent any attempts to uncover these keys. 
Moreover, the VSaaS provides mechanisms to change the 
keys if any compromising happens. 
It is not possible to send a false location, because the 
algorithm of the sending secure VIM reads the (xy-
coordinates) from the tamper GPS, which is build-in on the 
vehicles, and concatenates it to the VID in order to produce 
the EVID that is a part of the messages sent by the vehicles. 
Moreover, each vehicle has a tamper-proof device (TPD) 
installed by the manufacturer, to store all the secret 
information used in the VANET. It is fabricated such as no 
one can reveal or compromise its information. TPD should 
erase all the secret information if it is removed from the 
vehicle. This is providing a physical security to the TPD.  
The integrity mechanisms do not mentioned to in our work 
because of the encrypting of the whole message was 
proposed. Thus, it is meaningless to take into consideration 
any integrity mechanisms with encrypting of the whole 
message. To send secure VIMs, a security level was assumed 
to be equivalent at least to RSA 2048, which is supposed to 
survive until 2030. 
5. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, the throughput, end-to-end delay and the 
message delivery rate was investigated through the NS2, 
SUMO and the Trans simulations, to evaluate the security 
overhead of the secure Vehicle Information Messages (VIMs). 
The impact of the security overhead appeared on the 
throughput because the security overhead in the message size 
has an increasing in the throughput, but this effect is 
acceptable because the infrastructure's throughput capacity 
can afford this overhead. There is no considerable effects of 
the CA in the message delivery rate and end-to-end delay, 
because the low contention on the medium and the high 
transmission rate minimizes the effects of the security 
overheads. Moreover, our proposed model framework 
(VSaaS) was discussed against the security requirements in 
VANET. 
VSaaS model framework is secure, efficient, modular, 
managed by cloud, resistant against attacks and fulfills the 
security requirements. 
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